By Toni Nissi

Peace requires sovereignty. Sovereignty requires the State. That simple principle should guide
every discussion about Lebanon’s future.
As the United States and Iran pursue a new diplomatic understanding, much of the
international debate has focused on nuclear negotiations, regional de-escalation, and
preventing another Middle Eastern war. These are legitimate objectives. Every serious
diplomatic effort that reduces violence and creates conditions for lasting stability deserves
support.

Yet one critical question remains largely absent from the conversation.
Can there be lasting peace in the Middle East while Lebanon remains unable to exercise full
sovereignty over its own territory?
I believe the answer is no.

For decades, Lebanon has been viewed primarily through the prism of broader regional
rivalries involving Iran, Israel, Syria, and Hezbollah. While understandable, this perspective has
often overlooked the country’s central challenge: the progressive weakening of the Lebanese
State.

No republic can function when constitutional institutions do not exercise exclusive authority
over national defense, foreign policy, border security, and the legitimate use of force.
The restoration of that authority should therefore be the primary objective of every diplomatic initiative concerning Lebanon.

This is not merely a political aspiration.
It is the constitutional foundation of the Lebanese Republic, reaffirmed by the Taif Agreement
and repeatedly endorsed by the international community through United Nations Security
Council Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701.
These resolutions should not be viewed as separate diplomatic texts.

Together, they form a coherent international roadmap for restoring Lebanese sovereignty.
They call for extending the authority of the Lebanese government over all its territory,
securing Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders, strengthening the Lebanese Armed
Forces, and ensuring that no armed organization operates outside the authority of the State.

More than two decades after the adoption of Resolution 1559, these objectives remain only
partially fulfilled.

The reason is not the absence of international law.
Nor is it a lack of diplomatic engagement.
The problem is that the international community has too often chosen to manage Lebanon’s
recurring crises instead of resolving their underlying causes.

Ceasefires have been negotiated.
Escalation has been contained.
Violence has temporarily subsided.
Yet the structural weakness of the Lebanese State has remained largely untouched.

As a result, every crisis eventually returns.
One of the most persistent misconceptions has been to view Hezbollah exclusively through
either a domestic or a regional lens.
Neither approach is sufficient.

Hezbollah is simultaneously a Lebanese political actor and an armed organization that forms
part of Iran’s broader regional security architecture. Ignoring either dimension inevitably leads to incomplete policies.

This also explains why Lebanon cannot resolve this challenge alone.
The implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559, 1680, and 1701 is
not an Israeli demand, nor an American demand.
It is an international legal obligation accepted by Lebanon itself.

Restoring Lebanese sovereignty is therefore not a concession to any foreign power.
It is the fulfillment of Lebanon’s own constitutional and international commitments.
Achieving that objective requires sustained international political, diplomatic, economic, and
security support.

But support must strengthen the Lebanese State—not substitute for it.

Lebanon has already experienced the consequences of foreign tutelage.
Whether exercised through Syrian domination, shaped by Iranian influence, or reinforced by
other external arrangements, the result has always been the same: weakened institutions,
fragmented authority, economic decline, and recurring instability.
Replacing one external influence with another is not a strategy.

It is merely the repetition of failure.
This is why the current diplomatic engagement between Washington and Tehran represents
both an opportunity and a test.
If it contributes to strengthening the institutions of the Lebanese Republic and facilitates the
implementation of international law, it could become a turning point for Lebanon and the
wider Middle East.

If, however, Lebanon becomes merely another file within a broader regional negotiation, then
today’s diplomatic success may simply postpone tomorrow’s instability.

Managing Hezbollah is not equivalent to restoring Lebanon.

One is a tactical objective.
The other is a strategic necessity.
American policy has consistently affirmed its support for Lebanon’s sovereignty and
independence.

Today, those principles should be translated into a coherent strategy built upon five priorities.
First, reaffirm unequivocally that only the constitutional institutions of the Lebanese Republic possess the legitimate authority to decide questions of war, peace, and national security.
Second, integrate the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559,
1680, and 1701 into every regional diplomatic framework affecting Lebanon.
Third, continue strengthening the Lebanese Armed Forces as the country’s sole legitimate
military institution capable of exercising authority throughout Lebanese territory.
Fourth, support effective control of Lebanon’s internationally recognized borders with both
Syria and Israel, reinforcing state sovereignty and preventing the movement of weapons
outside lawful government authority.
Finally, ensure that every future diplomatic arrangement strengthens the institutions of the
Lebanese Republic rather than adapting to parallel military structures that undermine them.
These recommendations are neither ideological nor partisan.

They reflect constitutional legitimacy, international law, and sound strategic policy.
A sovereign Lebanon serves the interests of every Lebanese citizen, regardless of political
affiliation or religious community.
It also serves the long-term interests of the United States and its allies.
A sovereign Lebanon strengthens regional stability.

A weak Lebanon exports instability

The Middle East has witnessed countless ceasefires.

What it has lacked are durable political settlements rooted in strong, sovereign states.
That is the real challenge before us.
The success of current diplomacy should not be measured solely by whether another war is
avoided.

It should be measured by whether sovereign states emerge stronger when diplomacy
concludes.

Lebanon deserves to become a fully sovereign Republic whose government alone exercises
authority over its territory, whose Armed Forces alone defend its borders, and whose foreign
policy reflects the decisions of its constitutional institutions rather than the strategic
calculations of external powers.

That objective is not only in Lebanon’s national interest.

It is in the strategic interest of the United States, the wider Middle East, and every nation that
believes peace is ultimately sustained by sovereign states governed by the rule of law.
Peace requires sovereignty.

And sovereignty requires the State.