By Michael Arizanti
On December 8, 2024, the Assad family’s 54-year grip on Syria ended abruptly. Just ten days earlier, opposition forces from northwest Syria launched a coordinated offensive in Aleppo’s western countryside. Their bold operation triggered the collapse of regime frontlines, effectively shattering Bashar’s government. After 13 brutal years of civil war—where Assad’s chilling mantra “it’s Assad or we burn the country” played out in reality—Syria’s conflict came to a sudden halt.
Weeks before, nearly ten European governments led by Italy had pushed to reconsider Syria policy and reengage with Assad. Even I had advocated for reengagement—particularly after Assad rejoined the Arab League at the 2023 Saudi summit—believing lasting peace remained the only viable goal. With Syria seemingly at a stalemate, the outgoing Biden administration had been quietly working to ease sanctions. Since spring 2023, most Middle Eastern countries had shifted their stance, accepting Assad as the de facto winner and believing engagement with his regime was the only way to contain the crisis’s spillover effects.
Assad’s fall brought an unexpected shift in Damascus, now controlled by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Once an al-Qaeda affiliate that evolved from ISIS’s precursor, HTS—under Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammed al-Jolani)—has transformed dramatically over eight years. After breaking with al-Qaeda in 2016, HTS accepted Turkish oversight and worked within a Russian-Turkish ceasefire. The group eliminated all ISIS and al-Qaeda elements in its territory and supported a technocratic “Salvation Government” in northwest Syria. Delivering better public services than previous administrations, HTS opened quiet channels with Western governments. The group shifted from global jihad to local revolution, adopting the green flag of Syria’s uprising. Remarkably, HTS-controlled areas reported fewer human rights violations than regions formerly under Assad or the Syrian Democratic Forces.
Few imagined Ahmed al-Sharaa would one day occupy Syria’s Presidential Palace in formal attire, meeting foreign dignitaries and flying to Saudi Arabia and Turkey for state visits. After years of quiet diplomacy with Turkish and Ukrainian officials, al-Sharaa’s Foreign Minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, appeared at Davos on January 22 alongside Tony Blair. U.S. Assistant Secretary Barbara Leaf met with al-Sharaa’s delegation in Damascus on December 20, joined by high-ranking officials including Presidential Envoy Roger Carstens and an American general who personally praised al-Sharaa’s military campaign as “remarkable” and “disciplined.”
In subsequent weeks, the U.S. established formal intelligence ties with the HTS-led transition through Interior Minister Anas Khattab’s General Security Service. U.S. intelligence helped prevent an ISIS plot targeting Shia Muslims in Damascus’s Sayyida Zeinab area, along with other planned attacks. The U.S. military maintains regular coordination with HTS authorities—overseeing anti-ISIS operations in central Syria and facilitating talks between the SDF and HTS near Damascus. With U.S. approval, Syrian Free Army elements from al-Tanf Garrison are being integrated into Syria’s emerging national forces.
The transitional government consists primarily of HTS and allied Islamist groups like Ahrar al-Sham. While many Syrians worry about this lack of diversity, interim President al-Sharaa has emerged as a popular figure. Despite his elite Damascus background, al-Sharaa has reinvented himself convincingly. His public image—including his family’s involvement in state affairs and his attention to presentation—shows political skill and adaptability.
However, political acumen alone cannot solve Syria’s immense challenges. Half its infrastructure lies destroyed, over half the population is displaced, 90% live in poverty, and the currency has lost 99% of its value. With UN aid efforts diminished since Assad’s fall, humanitarian conditions have worsened. Temporary measures by the Biden administration—a six-month General License for limited energy and financial transactions—have done little to overcome financial institutions’ reluctance. Despite Europe’s stated openness to sanctions relief, concrete action remains lacking.
Meanwhile, civil society meetings highlight frustration with the SDF’s control of northeastern Syria. Seen as occupiers monopolizing natural resources, the SDF—mainly PKK-affiliated Kurds—was offered community rights, Kurdish language recognition, and government representation. These offers depended on SDF fighters joining Damascus’s new military. After lengthy negotiations, Ahmed al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi signed a deal on March 10—sparking nationwide celebration and marking a diplomatic win for the U.S. military.
Syria’s transition offers a chance to reshape the Middle East and counter Iran’s regional ambitions. Yet violence could return if crippling sanctions remain. Early March 2025 saw terrifying clashes when Assad loyalists attacked in Latakia and Tartus, leaving hundreds dead. Evidence suggests Iranian involvement meant to trigger retaliatory violence. While the interim government has established investigative committees, its limited control and possible complicity in certain incidents threaten its legitimacy.
Syria stands at a crossroads. The international community must act decisively to support this fragile transition. Without immediate sanctions relief, Syria risks sliding back into conflict and instability. The stakes are enormous, and transformative action is needed now.
