By Carlos Abadi
Despite the theatrical last-minute Lebanese re-trade of the maritime dominion dispute, everything points to the fact that a deal will be signed this month at a date calibrated to precede actual commercial extraction from Karish.
If the deal gets done, as it appears it will, it would be a massive step in the right direction for Lebanon. The deal will signal the first time in history that Lebanon manages to cross the Rubicon of shrinking a conflict by negotiation. And shrinking it is, we have to keep things in perspective.
Even after the deal is signed, sealed, and delivered, it will keep the state of war very much intact. Lebanon will not have conceded that Israel has a right to exist in any borders, and Lebanon will not make any non-maritime concessions, such as enhancing the KYC/AML of the terrorist and or transnational criminal organizations it licenses to operate from Lebanon. Nor will there be any understanding of Lebanon committing to exercise efforts to enforce binding UNSC resolutions or restrain the FTOs from attacking soft Jewish targets abroad.
All of the above signals that the deal is tiny in the broad perspective of the seemingly endless conflict. So why do I celebrate it?
First, it will avoid a war à la libanaise, where missiles will be launched from densely populated civilian areas. It would inevitably lead to children going to sleep unknowingly with PGMs and never waking up again. Depending on the severity of the Hezbollah attack, the response was going to leave between thousands and tens of thousands left – mainly on the Lebanese side because of the use of civilian infrastructure for offensive military operations while denying the residents bomb shelters or any defenses.
Second, as stated above, this deal, if done, will mark the first time Lebanon can leap to obtain something it seeks by agreement more economically than by violence.
Thirdly, the deal was as generous to Lebanon as it could have been; of the 760 km2 under dispute, all 760 km2 went to Lebanon. This aligns with the defense doctrine of letting a hostile adversary have something to lose. The theory goes that if and when Qana goes into operation, Lebanon’s formal and informal leaders, as well as their respective holding entities, will enjoy a healthy cash flow that they will be unwilling to let go by engaging in capricious violence.
Clearly, I have some reservations, and time will tell if the agreement achieved the desired objectives. Indeed it is possible that Qana is a non-productive prospect or that its low productivity does not accomplish the “create a downside” effect the Israeli side seeks. It is also possible that, even if Qana is productive, the theory (which is an intellectual construct with scant empirical backing) doesn’t pan out and that Lebanon and/or the FTOs operating in its territory behave like the proverbial scorpion who bites the frog “because it’s in [his] nature.”
Even in light of the above risks, I’m glad this small step took place because it pushes back the risk of an unnecessary and costly military conflagration.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Carlos Abadi is the Managing Director of DecisionBoundaries LLC, a boutique international financial advisory firm specializing in financial restructuring, litigation support, and financial engineering. He tweets under the handle @Samawal_LLC.
