By Sally Goldman
In a significant escalation of Gulf Arab involvement in the ongoing conflict with Iran, Bahrain and Kuwait conducted secret airstrikes on Iranian military targets earlier this month. According to a Wall Street Journal exclusive, the two nations’ warplanes hit drone- and missile-storage depots and other sites—their first known direct retaliation against Tehran after weeks of Iranian attacks on their territory. The UAE provided critical intelligence on targets and defensive air cover, marking a notable instance of Arab cooperation against Iran.
This development underscores a shifting dynamic among Gulf states five months into a war that has drawn them in deeper than many preferred. Iran has focused recent retaliatory barrages on Bahrain and Kuwait, both hosts to major U.S. military facilities, hitting infrastructure and disrupting regional stability. The smaller Gulf states, long reliant on restraint and U.S. protection, have concluded that passive endurance is no longer viable.
The UAE appears to be playing a coordinating role. Abu Dhabi conducted dozens of its own strikes on Iran earlier in the conflict and has continued a more assertive posture even as Tehran largely avoided major recent hits on Emirati territory (aside from some tanker incidents). By enabling Bahrain and Kuwait’s operations, the UAE is effectively leading a limited coalition of Gulf states willing to punch back rather than absorb punishment indefinitely. This aligns with a broader reckoning: prolonged conflict threatens oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, investment climates, tourism, and the carefully cultivated image of the Gulf as a stable economic hub.
Not all Gulf capitals are aligned. Oman has long positioned itself as a neutral intermediary—the region’s classic bridge-builder with deep historical and practical ties to Tehran. It has hosted talks, maintained channels, and generally avoided confrontation, a stance some critics view as enabling Iranian influence or acting as a consistent soft underbelly in collective Gulf security. While Oman has faced some Iranian pressure and drone activity, its preference for mediation over confrontation remains intact. Qatar continues its characteristic dual-track approach: condemning attacks when necessary while preserving dialogue channels with Iran and emphasizing diplomacy. Doha’s hosting of mediation efforts and careful rhetoric allow it to avoid full commitment to any side, a pragmatic but often criticized strategy of speaking to multiple audiences simultaneously.
Saudi Arabia, traditionally the heavyweight aspirant to Gulf leadership, has been more restrained in the latest phase. Riyadh participated in earlier strikes alongside the UAE but is now described as evaluating its position amid the grinding conflict. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s government prioritizes Vision 2030 economic transformation, Red Sea export alternatives, and risk management against Houthi threats and further Iranian escalation. While Saudi Arabia has condemned Iranian attacks, urged stronger U.S. action at points, and retains significant military capacity, its recent lower profile has drawn observations of caution—some would say a retreat from assertive regional leadership when the costs of deeper involvement rise.
The Bahrain-Kuwait strikes, backed by the UAE, signal that parts of the Gulf are no longer content to remain purely defensive or wait for external powers to resolve the threat. Kuwait’s ambassador has publicly denied involvement after the WSJ report, and Bahrain has stayed silent, reflecting the sensitivity and risks of open acknowledgment. Yet the reported operations highlight growing Arab willingness to impose costs on Iran rather than solely absorb them.
Whether this limited coalition expands or remains a one-off response depends on the war’s trajectory. Iran’s continued pressure on Gulf infrastructure and shipping, combined with the economic pain of restricted Hormuz traffic and Houthi activity in the Red Sea, is forcing harder choices. For the states that chose action, the calculation is clear: prolonged vulnerability is more dangerous than calibrated retaliation. For the hedgers and absentees, the longer the conflict lasts, the harder it becomes to claim leadership or insulation from the consequences.
