By Ampamya Ronah
In the wake of Syria’s dramatic political transformation, Saudi Arabia has positioned itself as a pivotal ally to the country’s new interim government under President Ahmad al-Sharaa. The kingdom, led by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has taken bold steps to support Syria’s reintegration into the global community, most notably by facilitating the lifting of U.S. sanctions. However, as Saudi researcher Aziz Alghashian has emphasized, this support is far from a blank check. Saudi Arabia’s role is strategic, pragmatic, and conditional, aimed at fostering stability in Syria while advancing its own regional interests. This article explores the nuances of Saudi Arabia’s engagement with Syria’s new leadership, its potential role as a peacemaker, and the limits of its support.
Syria’s political landscape shifted dramatically in December 2024 when Ahmad al-Sharaa, leading the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebel group, orchestrated the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. As Syria’s interim president, al-Sharaa has sought to shed his past as a former al-Qaeda affiliate and present himself as a pragmatic leader committed to rebuilding a war-torn nation. His government has actively courted international legitimacy, and Saudi Arabia has emerged as a key partner in this endeavor.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has played a central role in reshaping Syria’s international standing. In May 2025, during a visit to Riyadh, U.S. President Donald Trump announced the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria, a decision heavily influenced by MBS and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. This move, described by al-Sharaa as “courageous,” marked a turning point for Syria, unlocking access to global financial systems and paving the way for reconstruction efforts. Saudi Arabia further solidified its commitment by hosting the Syrian-Saudi Investment Forum in July 2025, where over $6 billion in investments were pledged across sectors like energy, infrastructure, and technology. Additionally, Saudi Arabia and Qatar jointly settled Syria’s $15.5 million World Bank debt, enabling Damascus to re-engage with international financial institutions.
These actions underscore Saudi Arabia’s desire to play a leading role in Syria’s reconstruction. Al-Sharaa’s first foreign trip as president in February 2025 was to Riyadh, where he met with MBS to discuss cooperation in energy, technology, education, and health. The kingdom’s swift reopening of its embassy in Damascus in September 2024, just months before Assad’s fall, signaled its early confidence in Syria’s transitional leadership. Yet, as Aziz Alghashian notes, this support is not unconditional. Saudi Arabia’s strategy is driven by a mix of economic opportunity, geopolitical ambition, and a commitment to regional stability, rather than blind allegiance to al-Sharaa’s government.
While al-Sharaa has expressed a desire for Saudi Arabia to have significant influence in Syria’s affairs, the kingdom is not offering unchecked support. According to Alghashian, Saudi Arabia’s approach is rooted in pragmatism. The kingdom sees Syria as a potential economic hub and a counterweight to Iranian and Turkish influence in the region. By backing al-Sharaa, Saudi Arabia aims to pull Syria into its orbit, aligning it with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states like the UAE and reducing the influence of Iran, which had been a key ally of the Assad regime.
However, Saudi Arabia’s support comes with expectations. The kingdom has pushed for al-Sharaa to address critical issues, including combating extremism, protecting minority rights, and fostering inclusive governance. These conditions align with U.S. demands, as articulated by President Trump during his May 2025 meeting with al-Sharaa in Riyadh, where he urged Syria to join the Abraham Accords, expel foreign fighters, and prevent the resurgence of ISIS. Saudi Arabia’s facilitation of this meeting highlights its role as a mediator between Syria and the West, but it also underscores its insistence on tangible progress from al-Sharaa’s government.
One of the most pressing challenges for Saudi Arabia is navigating Syria’s internal divisions, particularly the tensions between al-Sharaa’s government and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria. The Kurds, backed by the U.S., have long sought autonomy, a proposal al-Sharaa has rejected in favor of a centralized state. Saudi Arabia has expressed willingness to mediate between Damascus and the Kurds, but only if al-Sharaa agrees to engage in meaningful dialogue. This potential role as a peacemaker reflects Saudi Arabia’s broader ambition to stabilize Syria while ensuring its own influence in shaping the country’s future.
Despite Saudi Arabia’s significant investments and diplomatic efforts, its support for al-Sharaa is not without risks. Al-Sharaa’s past as a jihadist commander raises concerns about his commitment to inclusive governance. Reports of sectarian violence, particularly against Alawites and Druze, have cast doubt on his promises to protect minorities. In March 2025, nearly 900 Alawite civilians were killed in northwestern Syria, prompting international condemnation. Saudi Arabia, aware of these risks, is unlikely to provide unconditional backing if al-Sharaa’s government fails to address such issues.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia’s ambitions in Syria are complicated by regional rivalries. Turkey, a key backer of al-Sharaa’s HTS during the civil war, maintains significant influence in northern Syria and has proposed a defense pact with Damascus. Saudi Arabia, wary of Turkey’s growing clout, is positioning itself as a counterbalance, leveraging its financial resources and diplomatic ties with the U.S. to assert dominance. Israel’s ongoing airstrikes in Syria, driven by concerns over al-Sharaa’s Islamist ties and the presence of foreign fighters, further complicate the regional dynamic. Saudi Arabia has tied its support for Syria to demands for Israeli restraint, linking Syrian sovereignty to broader normalization talks with Israel—a delicate balancing act.
Saudi Arabia’s engagement with Syria reflects a broader vision of a stable, prosperous Middle East aligned with its interests. By investing in Syria’s reconstruction and advocating for sanctions relief, the kingdom is betting on al-Sharaa’s ability to deliver stability and economic growth. The Syrian-Saudi Investment Forum and the reopening of the Saudi embassy in Damascus signal a long-term commitment to Syria’s recovery. However, as Alghashian emphasizes, this is not a blank check. Saudi Arabia expects al-Sharaa to demonstrate progress on governance, minority rights, and regional cooperation.
For al-Sharaa, Saudi Arabia’s support is a lifeline, enabling Syria to emerge from decades of isolation. The lifting of sanctions has already spurred investor interest, with American, GCC, and Chinese firms exploring opportunities in Damascus. Yet, the road ahead is fraught with challenges. Syria’s humanitarian crisis persists, with 16.7 million people relying on aid and 90% of the population living in poverty. Rebuilding trust among Syria’s diverse communities and integrating former rebel fighters into a unified national army will test al-Sharaa’s leadership.
Saudi Arabia’s role as a critical ally to Syria’s new leadership is a testament to its growing influence in the Middle East. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s efforts to lift U.S. sanctions and broker high-level diplomatic engagements have positioned the kingdom as a key player in Syria’s reconstruction. However, as Aziz Alghashian points out, this support is not unconditional. Saudi Arabia’s strategic calculus—balancing economic investment, geopolitical rivalry, and the push for stability—ensures that al-Sharaa must deliver on his promises to maintain the kingdom’s backing. By offering to mediate between Damascus and the Kurds, Saudi Arabia is also signaling its ambition to shape Syria’s internal dynamics. For now, the kingdom’s partnership with Syria is a calculated investment in a new regional order, but it stops short of a blank check.
