By Michael Arinzati

For nearly a decade, the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has been marketed in Western discourse as a democratic and radically progressive alternative to Middle Eastern authoritarianism. Governed politically by the PYD and enforced militarily by the SDF, the project presents itself as anti-fascist, feminist, and pluralist – a self-described rupture with the region’s history of centralized repression.

Yet when examined through the lens of political structure rather than ideological language, AANES reveals a system that closely aligns with the governing logic of historical fascist states – not through symbolism or mass rallies, but through institutional design. Far from being an accident of war, this architecture reflects lessons learned from 20th-century European authoritarianism: how to monopolize power while maintaining the appearance of participation.

This is not a claim of moral equivalence.
It is an argument about governing mechanics.

Party–Militia Fusion:
The Fascist Core.

At the center of AANES governance lies a fusion of party, armed force, and civil administration. The PYD dominates political life; the SDF functions as both military force and internal security apparatus; and “civil councils” operate under the supervision of party-linked intelligence and security bodies. There is no separation of powers, no independent judiciary, and no mechanism through which leadership can be peacefully replaced.

This structure closely mirrors Benito Mussolini’s Italy, where the Fascist Party absorbed the state rather than merely governing it. In Mussolini’s system, the party did not compete within politics – it defined politics. Elections existed, but only to ratify predetermined outcomes. Institutions survived in form, but not in autonomy.

AANES operates on the same logic. Political pluralism is formally acknowledged, but structurally impossible.

Ideology as Immunity, Not Constraint.

Fascist systems historically relied on myth to legitimize monopoly rule. In Italy, this took the form of Roman revivalism and national destiny. In AANES, the myth is ideological rather than national: “democratic confederalism,” derived from the writings of Abdullah Öcalan, functions as a moral framework that sanctifies the movement itself.

In practice, this ideology does not limit power – it absolves it. Governance failures, repression, and exclusion are reframed as revolutionary necessity. Dissent is not treated as political disagreement, but as ideological deviation.

This is a classic fascist maneuver: ideology becomes a shield against accountability rather than a program subject to debate.

Militarized Citizenship.

In AANES territory, political life is inseparable from security logic. Former rival Kurdish parties, Arab political figures, journalists, and civil activists have faced detention, intimidation, exclusion and even murders. The presence of an armed movement at the heart of governance ensures that citizenship is conditional.

This mirrors how fascist regimes normalized coercion as a routine political instrument – not always through mass terror, but through selective enforcement. Violence does not need to be constant to be effective; it merely needs to be credible.

The SDF’s dual role collapses the distinction between civilian governance and security enforcement, producing a population that is managed rather than represented.

Corporatist Civil Society: Participation Without Power.

Supporters of AANES frequently point to women’s councils, youth organizations, and local assemblies as evidence of grassroots democracy. Yet these bodies operate within rigid ideological boundaries and remain structurally subordinate to PYD authority.

This closely resembles the corporatist model of fascist Italy, where unions, youth movements, and professional associations were encouraged – but only as regime extensions. Civil society existed, but autonomy did not.

Participation is abundant. Power is not Learning From Europe’s Tyrants.

Modern authoritarian systems rarely replicate the overt brutality of 1930s Europe. They have learned instead to govern through managed pluralism, controlled participation, and moralized ideology. AANES reflects this evolution.

By maintaining councils, quotas, and inclusive rhetoric, the system avoids the crude authoritarianism that once triggered international backlash. Yet the underlying structure – party supremacy, militarized politics, ideological absolutism, and suppression of genuine pluralism – remains unmistakably authoritarian.

This is fascism adapted to the 21st century: quieter, more sophisticated, and wrapped in emancipatory language.

External Validation as Substitute for Consent.

Like Mussolini’s Italy, AANES has relied heavily on external recognition to compensate for weak internal mandate – particularly in Arab-majority areas. Western military cooperation and favorable media coverage have substituted for popular consent.

External legitimacy becomes insulation. It normalizes the system abroad while freezing political development at home.

The AANES project is not a democratic experiment derailed by war. It is a movement-state designed to prevent pluralism from emerging in the first place. Its resemblance to fascist Italy lies not in aesthetics, but in structure. Its continuity with the PKK lies not in liberation, but in control.

Anti-fascist language does not negate fascistic practice. Sometimes, it perfects it.